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Europe and Security Issues in Space:
The Institutional Setting
Frans von der Dunk
Professor of Space Law, Space and Telecommunications Law Program, University of Nebraska-Lincoln

In the current timeframe, the relevance of
discussions on the existing use of space for
national security purposes and the potential of
it to be used for non-peaceful purposes are
clearly increasing. 1 As a consequence, it
becomes more important to address the role of
Europe as a geopolitical, albeit far from
monolithic, entity in this context.
From this perspective, the present paper
analyzes some of the fundamental institutional
parameters shaping the European presence in
the space security domain, focusing on the
two key players in space, which are truly
European, the European Space Agency (ESA)
and the European Union (EU). 2 Interestingly,
the starting point for both entities was that the
security domain was a “no-go” area, a starting
point that only over the last two decades has
begun to erode. That is why, in addition the
Western European Union (WEU), Europe has
a certain role in this context, precisely from

the security perspective rather than from the
space perspective. 3
Even the European Community, as the most
tightly developed “pillar” of the EU, could not
be considered a supranational entity let alone a
federal state. In all cases therefore, the
individual
member
states
of
those
organizations are still relevant as players in
their own right. These states continue to be
essential to determining the shape of European
actions and approaches in the field of space
issues, and this is even truer for the security
domain.
The resulting complicated institutional
landscape represents the backdrop against
which, as well as a set of crucial parameters
within which, European policies in the area of
space are developed. This applies to the space
security domain, whether one takes a broad
approach as with Space Situational Awareness
(SSA) and the handling of space debris, or a
more limited one, focusing on international
terrorism or the handling of export controls
over dual-use sensitive goods. 4

1

Note that the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter, Outer Space
Treaty or OST) only requires states to refrain from orbiting or
otherwise placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit, as
well as to undertake activities in exploring and using outer
space “for the benefit and in the interests of all countries.”
The phrase of “peaceful purposes” is only applied explicitly
to the Moon and other celestial bodies.
2
ESA was established by means of the Convention for the
Establishment of a European Space Agency (hereafter, ESA
Convention); and the EU, as an overarching institutional
structure encompassing in particular the European
Community, was established by the Treaty on European
Union.

3

The Western European Union was established by means of
the Treaty of Economic, Social, and Cultural Collaboration
and Collective Self-Defense, Brussels, entered into force 25
August 1948.
4
See Frans von der Dunk, “A European “Equivalent” to
United States Export Controls: European Law on the Control
of International Trade in Dual-Use Space Technologies,”
Astropolitics 7 (2009): 110.

72

Frans von der Dunk/Europe and Security Issues in Space: The Institutional Setting

The European Space Agency
The starting point for understanding the
present and potential role of ESA in the wider
context of European space security
discussions is provided by the general
institutional structure of the Agency. ESA,
headquartered in Paris, France, but with
additional establishments in a handful of other
European countries, currently counts eighteen
member states. 5 Thus, it clearly constitutes an
intergovernmental organization in the classical
public international legal sense of the word.
Given the complexities of European
integration, ESA has, as of yet, no formal
relationship with the EU beyond a number of
cooperative agreements, of which the
Framework Agreement is the most generic
and broad one. 6 The Framework Agreement
does establish a joint EU-ESA Space Council,
but this Council’s competences remain
confined to “the coordination and facilitation
of cooperative activities” under the
Agreement, and thus present a forum for
consultation and coordination of joint
activities, not a means to impose such joint
activities upon one or the other party. 7 From
the same perspective, the joint EU-ESA
European Space Policy of April 2007 is a
5

The list of member states comprises: Austria, Belgium, the
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom. In addition, non-European Canada is a longstanding cooperating partner under a special agreement,
whereas Hungary, Romania, and Poland qualify as European
Cooperating States under another special agreement.
6
Framework Agreement Between the European Community
and the European Space Agency (hereafter Framework
Agreement), entered into force 28 May 2004. See further
Stephen Hobe, et al, A New Chapter for Europe in Space,”
Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht I: 54 (2005): 342-344.
7
Article 8(1), Framework Agreement. See also Article 2(1),
providing for cooperation to take place “with due regard to
their respective tasks and responsibilities;” Article 4(1),
calling for “compliance with its own prerogatives, legal
instruments, and procedures” of each party; and Article 5,
detailing the way joint initiatives could be undertaken.

political commitment to develop a coordinated
policy, not for establishing legal obligations
between the two parties regarding cooperation
activities, either in general or in particular, and
the high-level space policy group plays its role
in exactly that context.
The Framework Agreement increased
coordination and cooperation in policy matters
and may well lead to the establishment of
proper legal commitments of one party to the
other, and/or official resignation of certain
legal competences in deference to the other’s
competences at some point in the future.
Presently, however, ESA is neither an agency
of the EU nor legally subject to the extended
legal regime developed on the basis of the
European Community (EC) Treaty – and it
does not even count the same European states
as members – e.g., ESA member states
Norway and Switzerland are not members of
the EU and eleven EU member states as of yet
are not member states of ESA.
ESA has two main organs. First, there is the
Council, consisting of representatives of the
sovereign member states, often at Ministerial
level, and acting as the supreme body of the
organization. The Council is tasked to lead:
the annual work plans of the Agency; the
annual general budget of the Agency; each
program budget; the financial regulations and
all other financial arrangements of the
Agency; decisions on the admission of new
member states; and all other measures
necessary for the fulfillment of the purpose of
the Agency within the framework of the ESA
Convention. 8 In other words, the Council, and
thereby ESA, has not, at the highest level, the
formal competence to draft space policies – it
is only charged with “elaborating and
implementing a long-term European space
policy” by means of the exercise amongst
8

See Article XI(5), ESA Convention.
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others of such competencies as enumerated
above. 9
Second, the ESA Director General (DG)
together with other ESA staff does not
constitute a policy-making organ formally
speaking. The DG is tasked to manage the
Agency and execute any such programs “in
accordance with the directives issued by the
Council” as well as being entitled to submit
proposals for future programs and projects. 10
As to that latter competence, the actual impact
the DG may have on the formulation of
programs and projects, and perhaps informally
and/or indirectly of policies, depends upon a
number of interlocking factors of a non-legal
nature. Yet that impact would be subject to
confirmation and a form of high-level control
by the Council as enshrined in the latter’s
competencies and thus by ESA member states
jointly.
ESA’s general aims and purposes are
summarized by the ESA Convention “to
provide for and to promote, for exclusively
peaceful purposes, cooperation among
European States in space research and
technology and their space applications, with a
view to their being used for scientific purposes
and for operational space applications
systems.” 11 For good reason, ESA has often
been described as a vehicle for member states
to both serve their individual space policy
needs, where applicable, and try and establish
a European space policy. Formally speaking,
as discussed, the Council in using its
competencies decides more on programs and
projects, even if at a high-level, and thus gives
substance and shape to policies largely
emanating at the member state level.

The key to further understanding the proper
role of ESA in the shaping of European
policies and regulations relevant to space
security therefore lies in the way in which
ESA space programs are developed. Program
development, generally speaking, can be one
of three kinds.
Firstly, there are the “mandatory activities,” in
which all ESA member states are obligated to
participate in. To approve a relevant proposal,
to undertake an ESA program, and to establish
it as a mandatory activity, a simple majority of
the member states is required. However, the
level of resources to be made available for that
program requires unanimity, which allows
individual states to exert considerable power
on the overall process of making a program
happen or not. 12
Mandatory activities concern the execution of
basic
activities,
such
as
education,
documentation, studies of future projects,
research work, and scientific programs
including satellites and other space systems.
To the extent follow-up activities on the
ground are concerned, ESA should “collect
relevant information and disseminate it to
Member States, draw attention to gaps and
duplication, and provide advice and assistance
for the harmonization of international and
national programs.” 13 Further to the
mandatory character of the participation of all
member states in these scientific, non-space
activities, the financing of such activities once
properly agreed is taking place through a predetermined scale of respective contributions. 14

12

See Ibid., Article XI(5.a), sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii).
Ibid., Article V(1.a), sub-paragraphs (i), (ii) and (iii). See
further Kevin Madders, A New Force at a New Frontier:
Europe’s Development in the Space Field of Its Main Actors,
Policies, Law and Activities from its Beginnings up to the
Present (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 189, 223-235.
14
See Ibid., Article XIII(1).
13

9

Ibid., Article II(a).
See Ibid., Article XII(1.b).
11
Ibid., Article II.
10
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Secondly, ESA member states may agree on
“optional activities” – again by a simple
majority. 15 The optional character then
manifests itself by way of an opt-out clause, as
it is provided that “all Member States
participate apart from those that formally
declare themselves not interested in
participating therein.” 16 This results in the
clear possibility for a member state, if it
considers it not to be in its own interests,
including security interests, to abstain from
participation in ESA optional activities.
Optional activities also result in a different
schedule for financing. Whereas the formula
here is an opt-out from the standard rule of
financing in proportion to the average national
income over the most recent three years for
mandatory programs, 17 in actual practice
things turn out to work differently. Normally,
individual member state contributions are
decided from the ground up, i.e., each state
promises as following from its own particular
measure of interests in such activities to
contribute a certain percentage to the proposed
budget of a certain program. Once the
proposed optional program reaches a certain
threshold in terms of promised financing it is
formally accepted as an ESA optional
program.
Optional activities concern in particular the
space programs, as opposed to preparation for
them and their after-mission interpretation and
usage: “the design, development, construction,
launching, placing in orbit, and control of
satellites and other space systems; and the
design, development, construction, and
operation of launch facilities and space
transport systems.” 18 Over the years, in
15

See Ibid., Article XI(5.c), sub-paragraph (i).
Ibid, Article V(1).
17
See Ibid., Article XIII(2).
18
Ibid., Article V(1.b). See further Kevin Madders, A New
Force at a New Frontier: Europe’s Development in the Space
Field of Its Main Actors, Policies, Law and Activities from its
16

monetary terms, programs with an optional
character have made up 80% to 85% of the
activities developed by ESA itself, as opposed
to 15% to 20% being mandatory in nature. 19
Many of the details of how programs are
developed and executed follow from what is
labeled “the industrial policy which the
Agency is to elaborate and apply” as part of
the broader aims and objectives under Article
II of the ESA Convention, and Annex V,
which elaborates that generic industrial
policy. 20
These cornerstones of ESA industrial policy
are implemented by means of the
“geographical distribution” approach, to
“ensure that all Member States participate in
an equitable manner, having regard to their
financial contribution.” 21 The result of that
approach, further elaborated in Annex V to the
ESA Convention, is often labeled “fair
return,” “industrial return,” or “juste retour.”
Under juste retour, each member state should
roughly see its investment in a particular
program “returned” in the form of contracts
for its space industry, preferably for the very
program at issue, in the alternative as
compensated by contracts in other programs. 22

Beginnings up to the Present (Cambridge University Press,
1997), 189-195, 235.
19
See Kevin Madders cited above, 189.
20
Ibid., Article VII(1).
21
Ibid., Article VII(1.c).
22
See Ibid., Articles II, IV, and Annex V. While the ideal
“overall return coefficient” [Article IV(3)] implies that every
Euro contributed by a member state should be matched
exactly by a Euro’s worth of contract value for a company
from that member state under a contract by the Agency, there
are a number of complicated arrangements in place to allow
for considerable flexibility. See further Madders, 384-8.
Moreover, due to pressure from the EU in recent years, which
views this system with some suspicion, as it may easily have
anti-competitive effects within the European market, the
general application of the concept has become more relaxed
still.
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The dichotomy between mandatory and
optional activities has, throughout the decades
of ESA operations, been shown to work as a
remarkably
pragmatic
and
workable
compromise. It allows at the same time
respect for the need for states to maintain their
sovereign independence in choosing to
contribute to and participate in actual space
programs – on an á la carte-basis as it were –
and serving the need for some coherence in
ESA programs, in order for ESA to provide
any added value in terms of real cooperation
and an efficient pooling of resources.
The ESA Convention mentions a third
category of activities, one not as such
conjured up by or within the framework of the
Agency itself, but undertaken upon the
specific request of third parties, namely
“operational activities.” 23 As a consequence,
these activities are not financed by the normal
budget of ESA, but paid for, in principle on a
full-cost, not-for-profit basis, 24 by the state,
organization, or entity requesting such
services. 25

23

See Ibid., Article V(2).
Such a monetary reimbursement could of course be
(partially or completely) waived to the extent ESA considers
other interests to merit the provision of such service without
(full) reimbursement, and/or ESA considers itself de facto
reimbursed by in-kind compensation. For example in the
context of the International Space Station (ISS), it is common
practice that the partners exchange services and goods as
much as possible on a closed-purse, no-exchange-of-funds
basis. See Article 15(5), Agreement among the Government of
Canada, Governments of Member States of the European
Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of
the Russian Federation, and the Government of the United
States of America concerning Cooperation on the Civil
International Space Station, Washington, entered into force
27 March 2001.
25
In the past, ESA has provided such services for individual
states, other international organizations, such as the European
Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites
(EUMETSAT), established by the Convention for the
Establishment of a European Organization for the
Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites entered into force 19
June 1986, as amended 14 July 1994, and entered into force
27 July 1994, and private companies, such as Arianespace.
24

75

ESA Involvement
in Space Security Issues
While as of yet not addressing to any specific
extent the actual or possible role of ESA in
shaping European space security issues, in
general terms, the possibility to become so
involved at various levels depends on the
interest of individual ESA member states. In
particular, the major investors in ESA and
ESA programs – France, Germany, Italy, the
United Kingdom, and Spain – need to possess
the political will and wherewithal in having
ESA become so involved.
Article II of the ESA Convention underscores
this point, stressing that ESA activities should
be for “exclusively peaceful purposes.” To
start with, the general discussion during the
Cold War on the precise meaning of “peaceful
purposes” is important to consider as this
phrase was – with the same addition of
“exclusively” – found in the outer space
treaties. 26 Here, European states were inclined
to occupy the middle ground between the
liberal United States (U.S.) interpretation that
peaceful purposes included military purposes
as long as of a defensive nature and the stricter
Soviet interpretation that any military use of
outer space was prohibited under that concept.
The word “exclusively” constitutes an
interesting addition here; prima facie it
suggests that without that addition ESA would
also be entitled to act not for peaceful
purposes. If that were to be true, however, the
phrase “peaceful purposes” without that
addition would be devoid of any meaning –
essentially stating that ESA would be entitled
to conduct activities for peaceful purposes
whilst leaving it open to also conduct non26

See Article IV, Outer Space Treaty, also Article XI referring
to “peaceful exploration and use;” and Article 3(1),
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter Moon Agreement),
entered into force 11 July 1984.
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peaceful activities, since the addition of
“exclusive” would be considered necessary to
close the door on the latter option.
In other words: the addition of “exclusively”
does not effectively add anything to the legal
obligation, and should rather be understood as
a politically-driven confirmation of an
obligation already existing as regard to
“peaceful obligations,” to make sure no
misunderstanding would arise on the scope of
ESA’s activities. ESA did not wish to
antagonize the U.S. by contradicting its liberal
interpretation, yet at the same time was not
willing to allow any uncertainty regarding the
legal inability of ESA to get involved in
military and security-related space projects.
Copying the adverb “exclusively” from the
space treaties and inserting it in the ESA
Convention precisely achieved both results
simultaneously.
Following the Framework Agreement, even as
this agreement did not refer in any manner to
space activities with a security, defense,
and/or military component, ESA has gradually
adopted a more liberal interpretation. 27 At
least the word “security” is no longer taboo
now: an ESA Security Agreement, ESA
Security regulations, and an ESA Security
office were established, as was an ESA
security classification system with an “ESA
Secret” label where handling of relevant
classified information was moved from the
member states to ESA itself.
But as ESA re-interpreted “peaceful purposes”
in 2003 to mean it could unambiguously be
involved in military and defense related
security activities, the aforementioned
institutional structure remains in operation.
ESA programs could only become a reality
27

See European Space Agency Council, “Position Paper on
ESA and the Defense Sector,” ESA/C 153 (1 December
2003): 7-8.

following a majority vote by the member
states in the ESA Council on the program plus
unanimity on the financing, and this would
ensure that no ESA project would see the light
of day unless member states were satisfied it
would not unduly interfere with their
sovereign security concerns, including
compliance with their own understanding of
“peaceful purposes.” Only with the projects of
Galileo and Global Monitoring for
Environment and Security (GMES) to be
discussed below, that started to change
fundamentally, due as well to the role of the
EU with these projects – and then still only so
far as those member states allowed.
Further to that, ESA from the beginning could
not completely escape from the inevitable
relationship between space activities and the
issue of security. Satellite-based Earth
observation can without difficulty encompass
“spying,” the difference between launching a
missile and launching a payload is often
negligible from the technical perspective and
the high-technology character and global
scope of much of human spaceflight
endeavors inevitably causes it to have
important security angles. As such, the ESA
framework has had to deal with securitysensitive aspects of its “exclusively peaceful”
mandate.
For example, in deviation from the normal
requirement to exchange data on programs,
until the aforementioned recent establishment
of an ESA Secret label, ESA member states
were not required “to communicate any
information obtained outside the Agency” if
such communication would present a threat to
its national security, would be inconsistent
with its agreements with third parties, such as
non-ESA partners in space cooperation
ventures, or would be inconsistent with the
terms and conditions under which it had
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obtained the information at issue in the first
place. 28
Along similar lines, a fundamental
technology-transfer control limitation was
built into the ESA Convention. If technology
or products developed in the context of ESA
activities are to be transferred to non-ESA
member states, a special authorization regime
to be adopted by a two-thirds majority of
member states in the ESA Council is required,
ensuring that such authorization will not be
lightly provided. 29
In more general terms, not only the
implementation of new programs, but also the
admission of new member states to the
Agency requires a unanimous vote in favor by
the incumbent member states in the ESA
Council. 30 This is a common provision in the
charters of intergovernmental organizations,
but in the present context it serves to
scrutinize any potential new member from the
perspective of security risks, since once such a
state becomes a member it would be entitled
to the default paradigm of free flow and
exchange of relevant information on ESA
programs, technology, and products. 31 For
similar reasons, unanimity in the ESA Council
is required before ESA may cooperate and
conclude relevant agreements with other
intergovernmental organizations, non-EU
governments, and other non-ESA member
state institutions. 32
A final example of ESA’s involvement in
security issues concerns the development of
the Ariane launcher. The single-most securitysensitive space sector is the production and
operation of launch vehicles, in view of the
28

Article III(1), ESA Convention.
See Ibid., Article XI(5.j).
30
See Ibid., Articles XI(5.k), XXII.
31
See Ibid., Article III in extenso.
32
See Ibid., Article XIV(1).
29

77

very thin lines among a vehicle for launching,
an explosive payload against a terrestrial
target, and a vehicle for delivering a peaceful
payload in orbit. Not accidentally, this area
was the first to be subject to international,
albeit largely voluntary, arrangements – the
Missile
Technology
Control
Regime
(MTCR) 33 – to try and curb the proliferation
of relevant technologies outside the circle of
former Western allies.
As long as the Ariane launcher development
project was an (optional) ESA program, the
exclusively peaceful requirement of Article II
of the ESA Convention precluded any Ariane
vehicle being used for military or other
security-related missions, under the European
interpretation discussed before. Once the
Ariane vehicle, however, had achieved
operational status, i.e., could start to be used
for regular flights on a commercial basis, ESA
had to outsource operational and marketing
activities, as ESA was also limited by its
Convention to research and development
(R&D), even if those terms were sometimes
stretched considerably. 34
In the case of Ariane, a separate private and
commercial entity was established in 1980
called Arianespace. 35 Arianespace is a French
company with international shareholding as
well as ties with ESA and the ESA member
states, but nevertheless operating on its own
behalf in the emerging global commercial
33
Agreement on Guidelines for the Transfer of Equipment and
Technology Related to Missiles (hereafter MTCR), done 16
April 1987. Also, See Elisabeth S. Waldrop, “Integration of
Military and Civilian Space Assets: Legal and National
Security Implications,” Air Force Law Review 55 (2004):
189-90; and Frans von der Dunk, “A European “Equivalent”
to United States Export Controls: European Law on the
Control of International Trade in Dual-Use Space
Technologies,” Astropolitics 7 (2009). All current 18 ESA
member states are among the 34 state parties of the MTCR.
34
Article II, ESA Convention.
35
Statuts de la Société Arianespace (Arianespace Statute), 26
March 1980.
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launch services market. Its operations,
however, from the international space law
perspective, remained under control of the
ESA member states, by way of a complicated
international legal structure with three
documents at the core: the Arianespace
Declaration, 36 the Arianespace Convention, 37
and the Centre Spatial Guyanais (CSG)
Agreement. 38 Under the first two documents,
Arianespace is obliged to operate strictly for
peaceful purposes. 39
Yet as a private French company, Arianespace
remained under French governmental control.
For example, prior to the MTCR, for the
purpose of adhering to the Coordinating
Committee on Multilateral Export Controls
(CoCom) rules, 40 i.e., the North Atlantic

36

Declaration by Certain European Governments Relating to
the Ariane Launcher Production Phase (hereafter
Arianespace Declaration), entered into force 15 October 1981,
renewal as of 4 October 1990, entered into force 21 May
1992.
37
Convention between the European Space Agency and
Arianespace (hereafter Arianespace Convention), signed 24
September 1992.
38
Agreement between the French government and the
European Space Agency with respect to the Centre Spatial
Guyanais (CSG) (hereinafter CSG Agreement). See excerpts
of French version in ESA Bulletin 80 (November 1994): 67.
39
See Articles I.1.2(a), I.1.6(a), Arianespace Declaration,
ESA/C(80)8, 11 January 1980; Articles 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3,
Arianespace Convention, ESA/C(80)WP/8, rev.4, 18
November 1980; further see John Kriger, Arturo Russo, and
Lorenza Sebesta, A History of the European Space Agency
1958-1987: Volume II: The Story of ESA, 1973 to 1987, ESA
History Study Reports, SP-1235 (ESA Publications, 2000);
and Gabriel Lafferranderie and Harry Tuinder, “The Role of
ESA in the Evolution of Space Law,” Journal of Space Law
22 (1994): 103.
40
CoCom was established in 1949 as a joint organization of
the member states of NATO, Japan, and Australia, to prevent
the sale of weapons and technology to the Soviet Union and
its communist allies. CoCom was disbanded in 1994,
following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the
concurring de facto end of the Cold War, which inter alia
resulted in the opening up in principle of Russian and Eastern
European markets. See Michael Lipson, “The Reincarnation
of CoCom: Explaining Post-Cold War Export Controls,” The
Non-Proliferation Review 6 (1999): 33-51.

Treaty Organization (NATO) regime 41 for
controlling
security-sensitive
exports,
Arianespace fell under French governmental
control.
Thus, even the areas where the exclusively
peaceful mandate for ESA could not as such
avoid a possible entanglement in security or
military issues, control mechanisms and
procedures were in place. These mechanisms
and procedures ensure that the potential
threats to the security of individual member
states emanating from such entanglement
continue to be addressed without substantially
infringing their sovereignty.
The European Union
The involvement in space and space policy
issues, including space security, of the EU, as
the successor at a political, if not completely
at the legal level, of the European Community,
stems from a completely different background
compared to that of ESA. The Community,
then Union became involved in European
space activities and related policy issues
primarily as a regulator, and has only recently
become a player in its own right, even a
policy-maker – but this remains a secondary
role.
In spite of efforts to arrive at a European space
driven
by
the
European
policy, 42
Commission’s perception that space is a key
sector to the future of Europe, in this area (as
41

NATO was established by the North Atlantic Treaty,
entered into force 24 August 1949.
42
See White paper: Space: a new European frontier for an
expanding Union – An action plan for implementing the
European Space policy, COM(2003) 673 final, of 11
November 2003; Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament – European Space
Policy – Preliminary Elements, COM(2005) 208 final, of 23
May 2005. See further Stephen Hobe, et al, “A New Chapter
for Europe in Space,” Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht
I: 54 (2005): 340.
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in many others) the ultimate prerogative of
giving substantial shape to space policies by
implementing actual programs and projects
rests with the individual, sovereign member
states. As referred to earlier, a joint Space
Policy has been accepted recently, in 2007.

follow-on legislative measures. 47 The treaties
also provided these organs with extensive
legal competences, which they then used to
jointly extend the scope of EU law immensely
– by drafting and enunciating what is
commonly called “secondary EU law.”

This is clearly only a first step for the EU,
whereas the second, more important step of
being in charge of implementing such a space
policy, of being able to force unwilling or
conflicting national authorities in terms of
their own space policies, and of developing its
own space projects on its own behalf, is only
beginning to be undertaken with Galileo.
Currently, the first contracts for building of
the Galileo satellites and deployment of the
system have been signed.

Secondary EU law is composed of
Regulations, Directives, and Decisions. 48
Regulations are essentially laws on a
European level: they are phrased in general
terms and apply comprehensively, at least as
far as indicated or expressly provided for by
the Regulations themselves. The same
qualification as law applies to Directives to
some extent, namely as far as the required end
result is concerned: each state is free,
however, to reach that end result in whatever
way it sees fit, prior to a given deadline.
Finally, Decisions also provide binding law,
but only upon those entities to which they are
explicitly or implicitly directed. In each case,
they would override, wherever applicable,
national law or regulation to the contrary.

A distinct and partly supranational legal order
has by now emerged, where in many instances
the EU can in law override the interests,
policies, and even legislation of individual
member states, yet in the last resort all that is
still based on a number of treaties between
sovereign states. Together these treaties form
a body of primary EU law, inter alia creating
the main Union organs, officially referred to
as: the Council (of Ministers),43 the European
Commission, 44 the European Parliament, 45 the
European Court of Justice, 46 and most recently
augmented by a European Council comprised
of heads of state and government entitled to
develop policies – but based on consensus,
and without being formally entitled to guide

43

See Articles 227-243, Treaty Establishing the European
Community as Amended by the Treaty of Lisbon Amending
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community (hereafter Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union), entered into force 1 December 2009.
44
See Articles 244-250, Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union.
45
See Ibid., Articles 223-234.
46
See Ibid., Articles 251-281: meanwhile renamed Court of
Justice of the European Union.

At the same time, they are strictly legal
instruments, designed and only to be used to
implement and enforce higher-level policies,
policy interests, and approaches as agreed by
the EU with the Council, representing the
interests of the individual member states,
generally in a key role, not to develop and
determine them. Not even the Treaty of
Lisbon, the successor of the ill-fated effort to
achieve a Constitution for Europe, 49 which
had been hailed as the first document
providing the EU with formal competence in
matters of space and space activities, was to
fundamentally change this situation. In
consequence, the Union still pools together the
47

Ibid., Articles 235-236: see Articles 13(1), 15, Treaty on
European Union as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon.
48
See Ibid., Article 288.
49
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Rome, done
29 October 2004 and not entered into force.
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regulatory efforts of the member states for
specific purposes indicated in the relevant
treaties and essentially limited to those – even
as it established its own distinct legal order; a
sui generis-construction, which may be
referred to as a supranational “half-way
house” between an international organization
and a federation-like structure. At present,
twenty-seven European states 50 have thus
subjected themselves to a very extensive set of
rights and obligations towards each other in
the framework of the EU. As pointed out, this
concerned a group of European states different
from those interested in space and investing
therein to become member of ESA.
The European legal framework was initially
built through signature and ratification of the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
Treaty, 51 the European Atomic Energy
Community (EAEC) or Euratom Treaty, 52 and
the European Economic Community (EEC)
Treaty 53 all in the 1950s, as duly amended by
subsequent treaties in later years. Such treaties
included, in addition to the various accession
treaties allowing for new member states to
join the EC, then Union, the Single European
Act of 1986, 54 the Treaty on European Union
of 1992, 55 the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, 56
50

The list of member states comprises: Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
51
Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel
Community, entered into force 23 July 1952.
52
Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy
Community, entered into force 1 January 1958.
53
Treaty of Rome, or Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community (hereafter EEC Treaty), entered into
force 1 January 1958.
54
Single European Act, entered into force 1 July 1987. One
major result of the Single European Act was the integration of
the main institutions of the Communities concerned, in
particular the European Commission and the Council of
Ministers.
55
Treaty on European Union, entered into force 1 November
1993.

the Treaty of Nice of 2001, 57 and the Treaty of
Lisbon of 2007. Of these, as we shall see for
our space related topic, the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty of Lisbon are
the most important.
The European Union Legal Framework,
Economic Activities, and Outer Space
The essential elements of the Union’s legal
order referred to above present the EU with its
own measure of competencies and jurisdiction
– over a wide range of economic or economyrelated activities. Depending upon certain
circumstances and legal preconditions, they
can be directly applied not only to the member
states themselves, but also to private persons
and entities resorting under the domestic
jurisdictions of these member states. In
addition, in a number of cases the rights and
obligations directly applicable to individual
citizens and legal entities can also be claimed
directly by those entities. Bypassing domestic
jurisdictions of member states, the Court of
Justice can be called upon in a number of
instances by those concerned to judge upon
the legality of EU as well as national actions.
The existence of this body central to the EU
legal order represents an essential measure of
supranational adjudication.
As such, to what extent do the Union and its
legal framework affect the space sector?
Special as space is and distinct from and
outside specific member state involvement,
how would or could the EU expand such

56

Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European
Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities
and Certain Related Acts (hereafter Treaty of Amsterdam),
entered into force 1 May 1999.
57
Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union,
the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and
Certain Related Acts (hereafter Treaty of Nice), entered into
force 1 February 2003.
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impact to the extent considered necessary for
the European greater common good?
The answers to these questions lie in
understanding how the aforementioned
competencies and jurisdictions are applied to
concrete issues – the application has to be
made by explicit primary EU law, secondary
EU law (much more common), or from EU
law no other conclusion can be drawn other
than such applicability was implied. This is
captured by the notion of “subsidiarity,” 58
which means that unless the competence to
legislate on a certain issue has unequivocally,
even if only implicitly, been transferred to the
Union’s organs the relevant power should still
be deemed to rest with the national
governmental authorities. If doubt arises
whether an issue could be regulated more
effectively and logically at the European level
or at the national level, the presumption under
subsidiarity is that the national level should
prevail.
In practice, only to the extent that spacerelated activities are unequivocally covered by
provisions in primary or secondary EU law,
can any competence to legislate with respect
to them be exercised by EU organs. Space
activities, however, only constitute one among
many topics from the Union’s perspective.
Hence, they were hardly mentioned explicitly
in primary EU law and not in any appreciable
detail in secondary law. As we shall see, space
has only recently achieved some presence and
prominence in that context. 59 Concomitantly,

81

EU competencies and jurisdiction have been
generally acknowledged in the economic
domain, applying to all economic activities
proper, i.e., without overriding public
interests, such as those relating to military,
social, or cultural issues being behind those
economic activities. Consequently, space
activities do at least fall within the EU legal
order to the extent that they may be
considered economic activities.
From such a perspective, the general
application of EU law to economic activities is
the main instrument for Union involvement in
the space sector so far. Here, the central and
most comprehensive aim of EU economic
integration is the creation and maintenance of
a common market. 60 Effectively, the Internal
Market, being one side of the common market,
was established as of 1993 following the entry
into force of the Treaty on European Union. 61
This regime, in turn, is based upon several
freedoms: the freedoms of movement of
goods, persons, services, and capital; 62 an antitrust regime combating anti-competitive
behavior of governments (state aid) and
companies (collusive conduct and abuses of
dominant
positions)
alike; 63
and
national
harmonization
of
relevant
legislation. 64
Turning back to space activities from the
perspective of how policies take shape within
the EU, the Union’s organs, in particular the
Commission, have over time obtained some
freedom to draft, or at least prepare, European

58

Articles 5(1) and 5(3), Treaty on European Union as
Amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. The latter thus extended the
scope of application of the subsidiarity principle from the
Community’s actions (where it applied since 1993 under
Article 5, EC Treaty as amended by the Treaty on European
Union) to all actions taken in the name of the Union.
59
For an excellent recent account of EU involvement in
European space activities, see Imgard Marboe, “National
Space Legislation: The European Perspective,” Nationales
Weltraumrecht – National Space Law (2008), 31-46; Further,
see Kevin Madders, A New Force at a New Frontier:

Europe’s Development in the Space Field of Its Main Actors,
Policies, Law and Activities from its Beginnings up to the
Present (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 566-584.
60
See Articles 3, 4(2.a), Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union.
61
Articles 13-19, Single European Act.
62
See Articles 28-37, 45-66, Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union.
63
See Ibid., Articles 101-109.
64
See Ibid., Articles 114-118.

82

Frans von der Dunk/Europe and Security Issues in Space: The Institutional Setting

policies, through such varying non-binding
instruments as Resolutions, White Papers, and
Green Papers. 65 Yet, even with the 2007 EUESA Space Policy the boundaries of that
freedom are always those provided by the
body of EU law, and the political will of the
totality of EU member states to use their
prerogatives, in particular through the
Council, to allow any such policy initiative, to
condition or control it, or even to obstruct it.
Certainly, once a policy initiative is translated
into new EU law, the Council of Ministers in
its interplay with the Commission, the
European Parliament, and the Court of Justice
are able to control such a process to a large
extent. 66
European Union Involvement
in Security Issues
It should not be a surprise that as a
consequence of the above discussion, at least
until as recently as two decades ago, the
European organs were given very little room
to address military, defense, and security
issues, whether specifically in terms of space
or more generally speaking. Although the EC,
then Union, as indicated originated in a
65

The earliest such document relevant for space activities was
“Towards Europe-wide systems and services” – Green Paper
on a common approach in the field of satellite
communications
in
the
European
Community,
Communication from the Commission, COM(90) 490 final,
of 20 November 1990. For further discussion of the
development of an EU-driven space policy, see Gunther
Verheugen, “Europe’s space plans and opportunities for
cooperation,” Space Policy 21 (2005), 93-95; Thomas Reuter,
“The Framework Agreement between the European Space
Agency and the European Community: A Significant Step
Forward?,” Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht 53 (2004),
56-65; Kevin Madders and Walter Thiebaut, “Carpe diem:
Europe must make a genuine space policy now,” Space Policy
23 (2007): 7-12; and Nicolas Peter, “The EU’s emergent
space diplomacy,” Space Policy 23 (2007): 97-107.
66
See Articles 293-294, Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union, providing the basis for the complicated
decision-making processes formally applicable to the
development of EC law.

completely different context and for rather
different purposes than ESA, essentially the
same limitations to EC/EU action in the field
of security followed from the established aims
of its activities and institutional structure. As
to the former, the aims of the EC were
summed
up
exhaustively
in
the
aforementioned Article 2 of the EC Treaty,
which throughout history has been updated to
take into account new developments requiring
a European-level competence – and so far had
always excluded a reference to military,
defense, and security issues. The only
conclusion can be that this domain as a
generic area has not yet been included within
the EU competence. 67 Only with the Treaty of
Lisbon that has changed to some extent, as we
shall see.
Even though the European Commission as a
truly European organ has in principle the right
to initiate policy and legislative developments,
and the European Parliament as another truly
European organ has considerable competence
in both as well, at
Cooperation on the end of the day
military and this supranational
security competence only
issues…does extends precisely to
those
domains
take place, but falling within the
ultimately, EU sphere as
Europe states determined, until
still preferred to very recently, by
rely on Article 2 of the EC
themselves for Treaty. Extending
the scope of that
national sphere in any
security. formal
sense
requires the consent
of the Council of Ministers representing the
67

Note that the aforementioned subsidiarity principle
specifically calls for either explicit or implicit (but then from
a logical perspective irrefutable) transfer of competence to the
EC/EU level, as argued on the basis of subsidiarity before
such competence may be assumed.
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member states, or in cases of fundamental
enlargement of EU competence even new
treaties.
From the perspective of security issues, the
point of departure for European entities was
the fundamental lack of reference to
competencies in that area until fairly recently.
Security being so closely related to questions
of state sovereignty, the fact remains that in
the last resort the sheer survival of the state as
a relevant entity is at stake, and in spite of the
long history of political, economic, social, and
cultural integration since the Second World
War European member states have not been
willing to subject themselves in any
fundamental sense to a supranational entity.
Cooperation on military and security issues,
and the conduct of joint military exercises
does take place, but ultimately, Europe states
still preferred to rely on themselves for
national security.
Over the last two decades, however, partly as
a consequence of the end of the Cold War, the
demise of the Soviet Union, and the
fundamental reshaping of the geopolitical
landscape, the perspective on European
security started to change. The undeniable
success of the EU in economic terms –500
million inhabitants constituting the largest
single economic block in the world –
strengthened European self-consciousness
about a major role for Europe also in the
geopolitical arena. At the same time, the lack
of political and security-related coherence has
become painfully clear, in particular in the
context of the demise of Yugoslavia and the
ensuing civil wars, where only NATO and the
U.S. turned out to be able to restore some
measure of peace, and essentially by sheer
military force.
The ambitions of the EC thus started to
address the involvement of Europe in such
security domains, and it started to move
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carefully into that direction, and as it turned
out in some respects taking ESA along to the
extent these ambitions involved, or were
focusing on, outer space and space activities.
Essentially, the EC took a three-pronged,
staged approach: firstly, by transforming itself
formally into a EU; secondly, by starting to
address in earnest the issue of international
trade in security-sensitive goods and
technology; and thirdly, by undertaking space
projects jointly with ESA that inevitably
touched upon the security domain.
European Union Entrance
into the Space Security Arena
The renaming of the Community as the Union
in-and-of-itself was an expression of the
ambition of the member states, and of the
European institutions, most prominently the
Commission, to broaden European integration
beyond the more economically-oriented
domains. More to the point, the Treaty on
European Union effectively did extend the
scope of European integration as it had arisen
on the basis of the three treaties of the 1950s,
re-christening the EEC Treaty as the EC
Treaty, and by adding two more “pillars” of
the EU to the three Communities that had
been merged into one Community (those
pillars of the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP) and of Police and Judicial
Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM)
respectively). 68
Of course, it is the CFSP pillar, which
concerns us here, established by means of
Articles 10A through 28 of the Treaty on
68

The first pillar was now that of the European Community,
based not only the EC Treaty (Title II, Treaty on European
Union), but also on the ECSC and EAEC Treaties (Titles III,
resp. IV, Treaty on European Union). For the second, CFSP
pillar, see Title V, Treaty on European Union; for the third,
PJCCM pillar (originally labeled Justice and Home Affairs
(JHA)), see Title VI, Treaty on European Union.
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European Union. 69 This is where, with the
entry into force of the Treaty on European
Union in 1993, for the first time as far as the
EC/EU framework was concerned, issues of
security – the use of the words “defense” and
“military” were still judiciously avoided –
could be addressed. At least the word
“security” is prominently present in the text
now.
The CFSP, however, is a straightforward
intergovernmental construction and operates
completely outside
the established legal …gradually, the
structure of the European
Union
with
its institutions…as
supranational
compared to the
features. There is at
group of
best a marginal role
for the European sovereign states
Commission in its making up EU
context as supposed membership, are
guardian of the involving
overarching
themselves in
European interest.
issues of
For example, the
Commission “may security…
refer to the Council
any question relating to the common foreign
and security policy and may submit proposals
to the Council” as well as request the
convening of an extraordinary Council
meeting. 70 As a consequence of the Treaty of
Lisbon, the role of the Commission to “give
its opinion particularly on whether the
enhanced cooperation proposed [by EU
member states] is consistent with Union
policies” 71 may have been relocated to the
69

Note that the Treaty of Lisbon amended also the Treaty on
European Union, so that in the consolidated version of the
latter as per 1 December 2009, Title V now comprises
Articles 21-46.
70
Article 30(1), see also (2), Treaty on European Union as
amended by the Treaty of Lisbon.
71
Article 27c, Treaty on European Union, as inserted by the
Treaty of Nice.

Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union; it was not changed fundamentally. 72
Yet in principle, “Decisions under this Title
shall be taken by the Council acting
unanimously” and there is no formal
entitlement for the Commission to anything
other than being kept informed and allowed to
offer its opinion. 73
As a result, there also was no role for the
elaborate legislative, adjudicative, and
enforcement jurisdiction of the European
Parliament or the Court of Justice, which was
developed in the context of the EC Treaty.
The European Parliament, for instance, can
make itself heard on similar terms as the
Commission, but does not have any formal
say in the outcome of whatever legally
binding decisions would result from the
deliberation process. Even post-Lisbon, the
cooperation under the CFSP is essentially
cooperation between the member states with
the Commission in an unofficial mediating
role except where the existing acquis
communautaire (the total body of EU law
accumulated thus far) is threatened. Those
issues remain exclusively reserved for national
governments to deal with as they see fit to the
extent beyond having allowed for such
concepts as the European Security and
Defense Policy (ESDP), now Common
Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and EU
Battle Groups to be developed. 74
As referred to before, security at the European
level has had distinct historical roots. To start,
international cooperation in the areas of
defense and security had always been dealt
72

See Article 329(2), Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union.
73
Article 31(1), Treaty on European Union as Amended by
the Treaty of Lisbon.
74
See Articles 326-334, Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union. For example, the CSDP is the domain of the
Council of the European Union, representing the member
states under the Lisbon Treaty, not the European Commission.
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with in the context of NATO or the WEU. As
a consequence of the shifting paradigms, the
WEU is now being integrated into the EU
structures as part of the intergovernmental
CFSP. That integration turns out to be a slow
process. It started in 1999 with a first level of
integration of WEU functions into the EU
framework, and has meanwhile led to the
handing over of the WEU satellite center at
Torrejon, Spain to become the EU Satellite
Center, jointly with a European Institute of
Security Studies in 2002. Yet these transfers
have not been finalized – and some doubt
whether such integration will be ever
complete. 75 The integration described here
does not ipso facto subsume the WEU within
the EU’s institutional structures.

the specific military domain, the erstwhile
main focus of the WEU. 77

Prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, the Treaty on
European Union referred to the role of the
WEU in somewhat ambiguous terms. Security
policies in the context of the CFSP pillar
“shall not prevent the development of closer
cooperation between two or more Member
States on a bilateral level, in the framework of
the Western European Union (WEU) and
NATO, provided such cooperation does not
run counter to or impede that provided for”
through the CFSP. 76 The clauses that have
replaced this one as per the Treaty of Lisbon
do not mention the WEU in any specific terms
and as a consequence of dealing with
essentially the same subject matter might be
argued to have effectively emptied the WEU
of all meaning. Yet any implementation
thereof still hinges crucially on member state
agreement to any substantive implementation
of the common and foreign security policy in

The second inroad the Union started to make
into the realm of security concerns the risks
inherent in today’s voluminous global trade
relations. These risks deal with proliferation of
security-sensitive dual-use goods, technology,
and know-how to states or non-state entities
that would result in harming European
interests.

In short, in this institutional domain of
European involvement in space security,
slowly but gradually, the European institutions
properly speaking, as compared to the group
of sovereign states making up EU
membership, are involving themselves in
issues of security in a broad sense. It seems
inevitable that this process increasingly will
also involve more clearly outlined military
and defense issues.
The European Union
and the Trade Aspects of Security

In a sense, this was the most logical and
obvious
starting
point
for
the
Community/Union to get involved with the
security domain, as international trade and the
potentially trade-distorting impact thereof on
the EC Internal Market had belonged to the
EC’s competencies for a considerable time.
And indeed, already long before the
establishment of the EU and the CFSP pillar,
the Community had drafted a first legislative
document on export controls, the 1969
Regulation 2603/69. 78

75

See Ralph Folsom, Principles of European Union Law
(2005), 25. Formally, the WEU still is its own
intergovernmental self, though now essentially dormant; the
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon has not yet led to
decisions to disband the WEU.
76
Article 17, Treaty on European Union as Amended by the
Treaty of Nice.

77

See Articles 42 and forward, Treaty on European Union as
Amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, inter alia also providing
for an (in legal terms equally limited) role of the European
Defense Agency.
78
Regulation of the Council establishing common rules for
exports, (EEC) No. 2603/69, of 20 December 1969.
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These
developments
were
given
a
considerable boost by several developments in
the 1990s. First, there was the aforementioned
creation of the Union and the CFSP – leading
to such further EC law as Regulation
3381/94 79 and Decision 94/942/CFSP 80
drafted under the Treaty on European Union,
even as these documents were far from
comprehensive in scope. Second, the changing
geopolitical
landscape
caused
the
81
aforementioned CoCom/MTCR-regime to be
widened in scope, most notably leading to the
establishment
of
the
Wassenaar
Arrangement 82 encompassing all dual-use
sensitive technologies and related products
and know-how in the mid-1990s. Third, the
limited progress, as compared to the ambitions
of the then-Commission, of development of
European security policy, including but not
limited to space, in terms of a European Space
Strategy on the basis of the CFSP made the
European institutions more aware of the
limited areas where progress could more
easily and readily be expected, namely
international security and international trade.

from the formally non-binding MTCR and
Wassenaar regimes, while working towards a
harmonization of the ways and means by
which individual member states would
implement and apply those international
obligations and guidelines. 84 As the
Regulation itself phrases it: its aims are to
develop an “effective common system of
export controls on dual-use items [which] is
necessary to ensure... the international
commitments and responsibilities of the
Member States, especially regarding nonproliferation, and of the European Union,”
through “a common control system and
harmonized policies for enforcement and
monitoring” as “a prerequisite for establishing
the free movement of dual-use items inside the
Community” – the most fundamental
justification for EU institutions to address the
issue of international trade in dual-use
goods. 85

The result was of all this was Regulation
1334/2000 83 providing a baseline framework
for implementing in a binding European
context the international obligations resulting

84

79

Council Regulation setting up a Community regime for the
control of exports of dual-use goods, No. 3381/94/EC, of 19
December 1994.
80
Council Decision on the joint action adopted by the Council
of the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union
concerning the control of exports of dual-use goods,
94/942/CFSP, of 19 December 1994.
81
Currently, 19 out of the 27 EU member states – Cyprus,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia are missing – are participating in the MTCR.
82
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies
(hereafter Wassenaar Arrangement), effective 12 July 1996.
Currently, 26 out of the 27 EU member states – only Cyprus
is missing – as well as all 18 ESA member states are
participating in the Arrangement.
83
Council Regulation setting up a Community regime for the
control of exports of dual-use items and technology, No.
1334/2000/EC, of 22 June 2000.

The Regulation itself has been amended on
average almost once a year since by later
instruments of EC law, 86 but still remains the
An extended analysis of Regulation 1334/2000 and the
framework built upon it can be found in Frans von der Dunk,
“A European “Equivalent” to United States Export Controls:
European Law on the Control of International Trade in DualUse Space Technologies,” Astropolitics 7 (2009): 110-124.
85
See Paragraphs (2), (3), Preamble, Regulation 1334/2000,
and Article 1.
86
This concerns Council Regulation amending Regulation
(EC) No. 1334/2000 with regard to intra-Community transfers
and exports of dual-use items and technology, No.
2889/2000/EC, of 22 December 2000; Council Regulation
amending Regulation (EC) No. 1334/2000 with regard to the
list of controlled dual-use items and technology when
exported, No. 458/2001/EC, of 6 March 2001; Council
Regulation amending and updating Regulation (EC) No.
1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of
exports of dual-use items and technology, No. 2432/2001/EC,
of 20 November 2001; Council Regulation amending
Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a Community
regime for the control of exports of dual-use items and
technology, No. 880/2002/EC, of 27 May 2002; Council
Regulation amending and updating Regulation (EC) No
1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control of
exports of dual-use items and technology, No. 149/2003/EC,
of 27 January 2003; Council Regulation amending and
updating Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a
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key document in the present context. Its main
body provides for the basic regime whereas
the Annexes, through their regular updates,
take account of new developments regarding
the subject matter itself as following inter alia
from the Wassenaar Arrangement updates. In
particular, Annex I entitled “List of Dual-Use
Items and Technology,” and thereby listing all
items subject to the regime created by the
Regulation, was amended time and again to
keep track of ongoing technical, practical, and
political developments. 87
Dual-use items as covered by the Regulation’s
regime are broadly defined as all “items,
including software and technology, which can
be used for both civil and military purposes,” 88
whereas export comprises normal export of
goods, but extends to “transmission of
software or technology by electronic media,
fax, or telephone to a destination outside the
Community,” 89 and “exporter” is equally
broadly defined. 90 Since such a definition of
dual-use items clearly could encompass more
or less all space technology, the broad sweep
ratione materiae of the European regime in
terms of space activities becomes clear
immediately.

Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use
items and technology, No. 1504/2004/EC, of 19 July 2004;
Council Regulation amending and updating Regulation (EC)
No 1334/2000 setting up a Community regime for the control
of exports of dual-use items and technology, No.
394/2006/EC, of 27 February 2006; Council Regulation
amending and updating Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000
setting up a Community regime for the control of exports of
dual-use items and technology, No. 1183/2007/EC, of 18
September 2007; and Council Regulation amending and
updating Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 setting up a
Community regime for the control of exports of dual-use
items and technology, No. 1167/2008/EC, of 24 October
2008.
87
Annex I, Regulation 1167/2008; further see Article 3,
Regulation 1334/2000.
88
Article 2(a), Regulation 1334/2000.
89
Ibid., Article 2(b), sub-paragraph (iii).
90
See Ibid., Article 2(c).

87

Technology itself is also defined in such broad
terms, albeit not in the main body of the
Regulation itself, but by Annex I: “specific
information necessary for the ‘development,’
‘production,’ or ‘use’ of goods” further
elaborated in that “this information takes the
form of ‘technical data’ or ‘technical
assistance,’” whereby the latter “may take
forms, such as instructions, skills, training,
working knowledge, and consulting services
and may involve the transfer of ‘technical
data,’” and these may in turn “take forms,
such as blueprints, plans, diagrams, models,
formulae, tables, engineering designs and
specifications, manuals and instructions
written or recorded on other media, or devices,
such as disk, tape, read-only memories.” 91
The core element of the regime developed on
the basis of the Regulation concerns the
authorization process and procedures, which
remains a prerogative of the EU member
states, but should conform to the parameters
as provided by the Regulation’s regime. The
point of departure, in any event, still is
national authorization.
Firstly, such an authorization is required for
export of the dual-use items as defined and
listed in Annex I. 92 Secondly, the obligations
of a prospective exporter are not limited to
screening an exhaustive list and then abiding
by its terms, as there are scenarios under
which an exporter would be obliged to comply
with the control and authorization mechanisms
provided by the Regulation, also where the
items concerned as such are not listed in
Annex I. 93
91

Annex I, Regulation 1167/2008.
See Article 3(1), Regulation 1334/2000; and introductory
paragraph, Annex I – List of Dual-Use Items and Technology,
Regulation 1167/2008.
93
The three scenarios concern: (1) potential involvement of
the item concerned in the context of weapons of mass
destruction; (2) export to a state subject to an arms embargo
imposed by the European Union, the Organization for
92
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As national sovereignty of member states is
still the baseline, the Regulation does not take
away the possibility for a prospective exporter
to be confronted with requirements for
authorizations imposed by member states
under national laws and regulations outside of
the system of the Regulation properly
speaking. 94 In such cases, the Regulation only
imposes upon the member state adopting or
maintaining relevant legislation a duty to
inform other member states as well as the
Commission. 95
With regard to these national authorization
regimes, the Regulation only further imposes
the requirement that they should allow for
three types of authorizations: individual,
global, or general, with the latter being valid
throughout the Community. 96 While leaving
the choice to the national member state
authorities regarding which type of
authorization to use in a certain case, a few
specific limits are imposed by the Regulation
in that regard. 97
Next to that, as the cornerstone of actual
harmonization, the Regulation introduces the
concept of the Community General Export
Authorization
(CGEA). 98
The
CGEA
explicitly constitutes an exception to the
sovereign discretion of member states as for
all items not covered by it; any authorization

shall be granted – or refused – by the member
state where the exporter is located. 99
The CGEA’s scope is essentially limited in
three ways. One, ratione materiae only items
as defined by Annex II – with the exception
moreover of those mentioned in Part 2 thereof
– require a CGEA as opposed to a national
authorization, which still covers the bulk of
items listed in Annex I. 100 Two, however,
ratione personae the CGEA covers such
exports only to the extent the target
destination is Australia, Canada, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, or the U.S. 101
Three, further exceptions to applicability of
the CGEA occur in more limited scenarios. 102
Thus, Regulation 1334/2000 in conjunction
with follow-up Regulations created a complex
interlocking system of European-wide and
national authorizations. That system required
European-wide authorizations instead of
national ones in varying measures for the
export of the items listed in a few interlocking
Annexes to other EU member states, a limited
set of close political allies of other states and
destinations, otherwise leaving the individual
sovereign discretion of the member states
intact.
Nevertheless, presenting a kind of European
equivalent to U.S. export controls, the
Regulation and the regime built upon it
99

Ibid., Article 6(2).
See Annex II, Regulation 1167/2008; Part 1 of Annex II
simply provides in full “This export authorization covers the
following items: All dual-use specified in any entry in Annex
I of the present Regulation except those listed in Part 2
below.”
101
See Ibid., Part 3.
102
See Ibid., Articles 1, 2, and 3, Annex II. These three
scenarios concern: (1) (once again): potential involvement of
the item concerned in the context of weapons of mass
destruction; (2) (once again) export to a state subject to an
arms embargo imposed by the European Union, the OSCE, or
the United National Security Council; and (3) where the
relevant items are to be exported to a destination within a
customs free zone or free warehouse.
100

Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the United
Nations Security Council; and (3) export without national
authorization or in violation of a national authorization; see
Articles 3(2), 4(1), (2), (3), and (4), Regulation 1334/2000.
94
Article 4(5), Regulation 1334/2000.
95
See Ibid., Article 4(6).
96
See Ibid., Article 6(2).
97
See further Frans von der Dunk, “A European “Equivalent”
to United States Export Controls: European Law on the
Control of International Trade in Dual-Use Space
Technologies,” Astropolitics 7 (2009): 122-4.
98
See Article 6(1), Regulation 1334/2000.
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represents a careful, detailed, and politically
noteworthy foray of the EU into the security
domain, including space security in view of
the inherent dual-use of most space activities,
hardware, and technology. The establishment
of the European Defence Agency (EDA) in
2004 103 may also turn out to contribute to
further fundamental EU inroads in legal and
political terms in the European security
domain, albeit that Agency falls under the
competencies specifically of the Council of
the European Union, not of the Commission.
As with the development of the CFSP pillar,
this development took place without the
involvement of ESA – although ESA’s role in
the European space endeavour under the
Regulation’s regime was recognized to the
extent that export controls on launchers and
launch-related items otherwise applicable
would essentially be waived for items “that
are transferred on the basis of orders pursuant
to a contractual relationship placed by the
European Space Agency (ESA) or that are
transferred by ESA to accomplish its official
tasks” or “that are transferred to a Statecontrolled space launching site in the territory
of a Member State, unless that Member State
controls such transfers within the terms of this
Regulation” – noting here that European
launches usually take place from Kourou,
French Guyana, which is French territory. 104
European Union - European Space
Agency Cooperation
The most recent angle from which the EU, this
time in close cooperation with ESA, was
venturing into the space domain, was the
103

See Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004
on the establishment of the European Defense Agency; also,
see Article 42(3), Treaty on European Union as Amended by
the Treaty of Lisbon.
104
Part I, Annex IV, Regulation 1167/2008, sub-paragraph (1)
resp. (4).
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development of two European “flagship
projects,” Galileo and GMES. Both concerned
major programs aiming at launching and
operating a system of satellites as the core part
of an infrastructure to be used for practical
downstream terrestrial applications. It may be
added that perhaps soon a third project is to
follow, i.e., the joint development of European
SSA capabilities, which will also have a
substantial, and probably even more profound
impact on security issues in space for Europe.
Galileo,
initiated
by
the
European
Commission, is the second-generation,
European-owned and European-operated
global satellite navigation system currently
being developed to be operational by 2013. 105
Its key features, as compared with the
currently operational satellite navigation
systems, the U.S. Global Positioning System
(GPS) and the Russian GLONASS (Global
Navigation Satellite System), have been listed
as being an internationally-operated system
controlled by civilians and providing for 27,
plus three spare, satellites in medium Earth
orbits (MEO). The satellite signals should be
augmented world-wide and should be
105

Council Resolution on the European Contribution to the
Development of a Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS), of 19 December 1994; Communication from the
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament –
Towards a Trans-European Positioning and Navigation
Network: including A European Strategy for Global
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), COM(1998) 29 final,
of 21 January 1998; Galileo – Involving Europe in a New
Generation of Satellite Navigation Services, of 10 February
1999, COM(1999) 54 final; Council Resolution on the
involvement of Europe in a new generation of satellite
navigation services – Galileo-Definition phase, of 19 July
1999; Commission Communication to the European
Parliament and the Council – On GALILEO, of 22 November
2000, COM(2000) 750 final; Council Regulation setting up
the Galileo Joint Undertaking, No. 876/2002/EC, of 21 May
2002; Council Regulation on the establishment of structures
for the management of the European satellite radio-navigation
programs, No. 1321/2004/EC, of 12 July 2004; and
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the further implementation of the European satellite
navigation programs (EGNOS and Galileo); No.
683/2008/EC, of 9 July 2008.
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available in principle for usage by many
transport as well as non-transport applications.
These satellites should furthermore provide,
apart from an Open Service similar to GPS
and GLONASS Open Services, three types of
enhanced services, for which users one way or
another would have to pay, of which the
Public Regulated Service (PRS) is of
importance for the current discussion, plus
search and rescue services additional to the
existing
COSPAS-SARSAT
Program
[International Satellite System for Search and
Rescue]. 106
Galileo has undergone various delays and a
number of changes of direction over the last
years, most notably discarding for the time
being the Public Private Partnership (PPP)
approach in financing, building, and operating
the system. The EU Council of Ministers by
means of a Resolution of 8 June 2007
unequivocally concludes in this regard “that
the current concession negotiations have failed
and should be ended.” 107 However, the
Resolution, as well as ensuing political
discussions within Europe at the highest level,
left little doubt that the European stakeholders
are determined to make Galileo happen and to
replace the private investments that are now
no longer expected with public investments
one way or another; indeed, public investment
has been achieved through the transfer of
unused Common Agricultural Funds. 108 The
most recent result of that determination so far
106

The COSPAS-SARSAT currently is a four-state satellite
system available to aircraft, ships, other vehicles, and persons
in distress for the purpose of sending emergency signals and
alerting rescue services; see International COSPAS-SARSAT
Program Agreement, entered into force on 30 August 1988.
107
Item 2, Council Resolution on GALILEO, 2805th Transport,
Telecommunications, and Energy Council Meeting,
Luxembourg, 6-8 June 2007.
108
Items 4-7, Council Resolution on GALILEO, 2805th
Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council Meeting,
Luxembourg, 6-8 June 2007; respectively Council of the
European Union, 2828th Council Meeting, Economic, and
Financial Affairs, Brussels, 13 November 2007, 14534/07
(Presse 251), at 18.

has been Regulation 683/2008 on the further
implementation of EGNOS (the regional
forerunner to Galileo currently operational)
and Galileo itself. By now, two test satellites
are operational: the GIOVE-A, built by Surrey
Satellite Technology, launched December
2005, and the GIOVE-B, built by Galileo
Industries and launched April 2008. 109
From several perspectives, including the
geopolitical one, Galileo is a major success
already prior to its proper deployment. Ever
since the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
became the first non-European partner to join
the project at the highest level, 110 many such
states have expressed their interest in doing so
and some concluded similar agreements. 111
Though, with the transition from the Galileo
Joint Undertaking (GJU) to the European
GNSS [Global Navigation Satellite System]
Supervisory Authority, as well as the funding
problems, these cooperative developments
have largely stalled, in the case of the PRC
even leading to a severe curtailing of the
actual level of cooperation. 112
Such involvement of non-EU, largely nonEuropean, countries had for the first time
raised major issues related to European
security issues, which the Commission had to
cope with. Notably, the Cooperation
Agreement with the PRC specifically did not

109

The first four in-orbit validation phase satellites for Galileo
are planned for launch by November 2010.
110
By becoming a member of the Galileo Joint Undertaking
(GJU), the precursor to the European GNSS Supervisory
Authority (GSA); see Cooperation Agreement on a Civil
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) – Galileo
between the European Community and its Member States and
the People’s Republic of China, of 30 October 2003; Doc.
Council of the European Union, 13324/03.
111
For example; see Cooperation Agreement on a Civil Global
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) between the European
Community and its Member States and the State of Israel, of 2
June 2005.
112
Space News 12 June 2006.
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include access by the PRC to the PRS. 113 The
PRS is the Galileo-service most akin to the
GPS Precise Positioning Signal. PRS will be
encrypted and physically protected, and only
accessible to a limited group of users – in
principle all governmental organs, some
hybrid service providers in areas key to
modern society, and also in terms of security,
such as energy and telecommunications
networks.
Also, the Agreement with the PRC touched
upon the issue of export control of securitysensitive space hardware and technology in
the context of Galileo cooperation. It notably
provided that “Exports by China to third
countries of sensitive items related to the
Galileo program will have to be submitted for
prior authorization by the competent Galileo
security authority, if the authority has
recommended to the EU Member States that
these items be subject to export
authorization.” 114 In any event, parties
reserved the right to apply applicable laws and
regulations in the context of EU-PRC
cooperation on Galileo as a safety precaution
in case key security issues would be perceived
to be at stake. 115 Regulation 683/2008, the
currently ruling legal document on Galileo,
provides on this issue that any additional
contributions by member states, third states, or
intergovernmental organizations can only be
arranged subject to dedicated agreements,
allowing a similar degree of control over
security matters. 116
Being developed under EU leadership, with
ESA as developer and procuring agency, the
113

On the other hand, see Article 4(2), Cooperation
Agreement on a Civil Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS) – Galileo between the European Community and its
Member States and the People’s Republic of China.
114
Ibid., Article 8(4).
115
Ibid., Article 5(1).
116
See Articles 4(4), (5), and 6(3) and (4), Regulation
683/2008.
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Regulation further outlines the envisaged
approach to Galileo, including the system of
governance that should apply to the
operational phase. Important for our current
topic is that the European GNSS Supervisory
Authority,
established
by
Regulation
1321/2004, is to fulfill the key role inter alia
in security accreditation and operation of the
Galileo security center. 117 In this respect, the
Supervisory Authority will operate under the
umbrella of the Commission, which takes it
upon itself to “manage all questions relating to
the security of the systems, duly taking into
account the need for oversight and integration
of security requirements in the overall
programs.” 118
As already has become clear, and in spite of
the civil governance structure to be developed
for Galileo, security issues will have to be
faced. Firstly, the possibility of potential
adversary use of its signals would still have to
be dealt with; someone has to take decisions,
in the worst case, to effectively shut down
parts of the system, when Galileo signals
threaten to be used by states or non-state
actors against the security interests of Europe
and European states. 119
Secondly, as referred to before, the envisaged
PRS, while painstakingly avoiding any
reference to military or defense, was modeled
in many respects on the GPS Precise
Positioning Signal. Whilst the PRS is
officially to be made accessible to all
117

See Article 16, Regulation 683/2008.
Ibid., Article 13(1). See further Article 13(2)-(5), as well as
Article 14 on the general governance of Galileo for security
purposes.
119
This was essentially taken care of by involving a “Galileo
security center” in the overall governance scheme for the
Galileo system, as well as specific security-related
regulations; see 16th preamble paragraph, Articles 7, 13, 14,
and 16, Regulation 683/2008; also see Council Joint Action
on aspects of the operation of the European satellite radionavigation system affecting the security of the European
Union, 2004/552/CFSP, of 12 July 2004.
118
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governmental services, debate has already
arisen about whether such governmental uses
should not also include the use by the military
of respective member states. To those familiar
with Western political history over the last
half century, it will come as no surprise that
France is most adamant in seeing no obstacle
to such use, whereas the United Kingdom, at
least until recently, was most adamant in
emphasizing that such military uses were
never contemplated, and should not be
contemplated, or at least be vigorously
pursued, now.
The other flagship project, GMES, is of more
recent date, and consequently has not yet
evolved to such an extent as Galileo, in
particular, as relevant to the present
discussion, in terms of an attendant legal and
governance framework to handle to security
aspects. 120 At the same time, it now seems
certain, with the launch of the Sentinel 1
satellite for GMES scheduled for 2011 (the
first Earth observation satellite for GMES)
that it will actually precede an operational
Galileo system to space. GMES is to become
the pan-European contribution to the Global
Earth Observation System of Systems
(GEOSS), representing a global effort to
enhance environmental protection with the
help of satellite technology.
Nonetheless, GMES represents the next step
for space security issues in Europe since this
project for the first time did prominently refer
to the concept of security – interestingly, in
the process extending its scope, as GMES was
originally meant to stand for Global
Monitoring for Environmental Security,
120

See further Council Resolution on the launch of the initial
period of global monitoring for environment and security
(GMES), of 13 November 2001; Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council –
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES):
Establishing a GMES capacity by 2008, COM(2004) 65 final,
of 3 February 2004.

before the latter part was changed to
Environment and Security. Security as
understood here gradually came to be
interpreted beyond the concept of “civil
security” so as to encompass more
“traditional” military and defense issues of
security. 121
GMES, being tasked to provide Europe with
its own independent and comprehensive
satellite Earth observation infrastructure for
generation of data and information on a
comprehensive range of subjects, will bring
the inclusion of defense, security, and military
matters into the broader civil European
governance structures. Like Galileo, this
impacts both the EU and ESA in terms of their
traditional domain having explicitly excluded
military, defense, and security issues.
Establishment of a coherent SSA flagship
project will no doubt move such developments
one step further again.
The Treaty of Lisbon
The developments regarding the increasing
involvement of the EU in the space security
domain are converging with the latest
European achievement, which is the entry into
force of the Treaty of Lisbon as of 1
December 2009. The increasing growth of the
Union – adding twelve new member states in
the time span of a mere three years (20042007) – was calling for a further
rationalization of the governance structure,
where a Commission having at least one
Commissioner of every member state and the
possibilities for small numbers of member
states to block legislative development in the
Council were threatening to make further
121
See further on this Frans von der Dunk, “A European
“Equivalent” to United States Export Controls: European Law
on the Control of International Trade in Dual-Use Space
Technologies,” Astropolitics 7 (2009).
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progress of the Union as a whole increasingly
difficult. Also, the calls for more involvement
at a European level in global issues of
sustainable development, poverty, climate
change, and last, but not least, the new
security issues and a consequent revival of
ideas to extend the scope of supranational
policy-making and law-making did not go
unheard.
As mentioned, the first effort after the Treaty
of Nice of 2001 to take a step forward in
European integration was the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe agreed
upon in Rome in 2004 – but this effort failed.
This was not in the least because the inclusion
of the word “Constitution,” and its presumed
corollaries of a “European anthem” and an
official “European flag” as symbols of the
perceived ambition to create a European
“super-state” with certain democratic lacunae,
triggered nationalist sentiments sufficiently to
make the treaty fail in the referenda held in
France and the Netherlands. An additional
factor blocking the required EU-wide
acceptance was the rather unwieldy and
“juridical-technical” nature of the document
that the combination of the various updating
treaties with particular the original EC Treaty
had become.
While the Treaty of Lisbon, to many a scaleddown and more realistic version of the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe, took
close to two years between acceptance of the
final text and entry into force, 122 in the end it
did succeed in becoming the key document
122

The Treaty of Lisbon was voted down in Ireland by a
referendum the first time around, and managed a favorable
vote the second time only after considerable wheeling and
dealing and a number of cosmetic changes; and even after the
Treaty had passed that hurdle, in particular Poland and the
Czech Republic were serious candidates to block the entry
into force of the Treaty – acceptance of the Treaty of Lisbon,
as of any other fundamental treaty in the EC and EU context,
had to be unanimous as between the twenty-seven member
states in order to lead to entry into force.
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underlying the European Union. Among many
other things, it also tried to further enhance the
position of Europe as an entity in its own right
in space and security, and consequently the
space security domain.
The Treaty of Lisbon and Security
As far as the security-side to the equation is
concerned, at least the principle of “security”
was partially transferred from the Treaty on
European Union to the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, and
included a reference to “defense” at the same
time. The first treaty was the one document
part of the Treaty of Lisbon where the EC
legal order and the key roles of Commission,
Parliament, and Court were not engaged; the
other, effectively the old EC Treaty as
amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, was the
second such document where EC law and
Commission,
Parliament,
and
Court
competencies did apply.
So, in matters of security, now “The Union
shall have competence, in accordance with the
provisions of the Treaty on European Union,
to define and implement a common foreign
and security policy, including the progressive
framing of a common defense policy.” 123
However, the actual implementation of such
policies refers back to the Treaty on European
Union, to wit its second pillar where the
intergovernmental structures reside. Also,
Article 4 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union makes reference to shared
competence between the Union and EU
member states in the “area of freedom,
security, and justice.” 124 Note, that “security”
is inserted in the text between “freedom” and
“justice,” whereby the term “security” may
123

Article 2(4), Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union.
124
Ibid., Article 4(2.j).
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arguably be somewhat confined to civil
security.
What the actual effect will be of this partial
“transfer” of the security domain into the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, will depend on the future usage that
the Union’s institutions may seek to make of
these clauses. On one hand, the shared
competence of Article 4(2) essentially means
that “the member states can in principle only
exercise their competences to the extent that
the Union has not exercised its competence, 125
which in turn means the Union’s institutions
can, following Article 288 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, adopt
Regulations, Directives, and Decisions.
On the other hand, Article 2(4) ensures that
any action of the Union in this domain will
have to follow the rules of the Treaty on
European Union in its version as consolidated
by the Treaty of Lisbon. Here, the Union may
now “define and pursue common policies and
actions” among others to “safeguard its
values, fundamental interests, security,
independence and integrity; … preserve
peace, prevent conflicts, and strengthen
international security in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the United Nations
Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki
Final Act, and with the aims of the Charter of
Paris, including those relating to external
borders,” objects clearly at least potentially
involving
security,
including
military
decisions. 126 To what extent such policies and
actions may comprise juridical or legislative
action, and also to what extent such policies
would essentially remain an empty shell

without actual follow-on juridical or
legislative action, may be disputed, but in
principle these would not be subject to the
democratic controls of the European
Parliament, and therefore remain within the
exclusive domain of democratic controls of
relevant national parliaments, and by the same
token would fall outside the jurisdiction of the
Court of Justice.
Furthermore, it is the European Council, a
special version of the Council of Ministers
comprising the Heads of State of the member
states, hence still first and foremost
representing their individual member states’
interests, 127 which shall now, further to Article
21 of the consolidated Treaty on European
Union, identify the
…at least the strategic interests and
principle of objectives of the
“security” was Union and take
relevant decisions by
partially unanimity, inter alia
transferred from in the area of
the Treaty on common foreign and
policy. 128
European security
Union to the The role of the
is
Treaty on the Commission
limited to the right to
Functioning of propose
external
the European actions other than
Union… those for the area of
common foreign and
security policy, which is the domain of the
occupant of the newly created High
Representative for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy, a special official which is,
although Vice-President of the Commission,
directly appointed by the European Council. 129
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Stephen Hobe, et al, A New Chapter for Europe in Space,”
Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht I: 54 (2005), 347.
126
Article 21(2), Treaty on European Union as amended by
the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaty Establishing the European Community
(hereafter Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European
Union), Lisbon, entered into force 1 December 2009.

127

See further Articles 235-236, Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union.
128
See Article 22(1), Consolidated Version of the Treaty on
European Union.
129
See Ibid., Articles 18(1) and (2), and 22(2); further Article
30.
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Article 24(1) of the consolidated version of the
Treaty on European Union echoes the
aforementioned provision of Article 2(4) of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, in allotting to the Union “all areas of
foreign policy and all questions relating to the
Union’s security, including the progressive
framing of a common defense policy.” This
common foreign security policy, however, is
subject to specific rules and procedures,
requiring unanimous agreement by the
European Council and alternatively the
Council of Ministers, but “the adoption of
legislative acts shall be excluded” and (with
one exception not relevant here) “the Court of
Justice of the European Union shall not have
jurisdiction
with
respect
to
these
130
provisions.”
In sum, in all of Title V of the consolidated
version of the Treaty on European Union,
entitled “General Provisions on the Union’s
External Action and Specific Provisions on
the Common Foreign and Security Policy”
and comprising Articles 21 through 46, the
Commission is referred to no more than eight
times, in a manner that can be described as
being on the fringe of the actual decisionmaking processes. From the same perspective,
the European Parliament is referred to a mere
seven times, the Court of Justice of the
European Union exactly once. By contrast, the
European Council has been mentioned 19
times, the Council of Ministers as such no less
than 74 times, and the term “Member States”
occurs 58 times in this Title. There is no better
way to directly visualize the different roles of
the first three, the “truly European
institutions,” as compared with the latter two
institutions where the individual member
states’ interests are most prominently
defended, in the context of security under the
Common Foreign and Security Policy.
130

Ibid., Article 24(1). See further Articles 28 and 31.
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It remains to be seen how the political
landscape, both within the European Union
itself and from a more geopolitical
perspective, will evolve and whether this
might, under certain circumstances, allow for
an increasingly larger role for the EU
institutions in security issues.
The Treaty of Lisbon and Space
In regard to outer space, the Treaty of Lisbon
was hoped for to present at least a courageous
step forward. When its failed predecessor, the
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe,
was being negotiated and drafted, it had
included two novel provisions offering a key
to considerably enlarging Europe’s role in
space.
Firstly, that Treaty provided in Article I-14
that “In the areas of research, technological
development, and space, the Union shall have
competence to carry out activities, in
particular to define and implement programs;
however, the exercise of that competence shall
not result in Member States being prevented
from exercising theirs.” 131 This clause was
part of the Article providing for the scope of
shared competence between the Union and its
member states, but the last part has led
commentators to conclude that this was not so
much a normal shared competence, but rather
a “parallel competence.” 132 In other words,
individual member states would retain
sovereign discretion to draft and implement
their own national policies and legislation in
this area.

131
Article I-14(3), Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe.
132
Stephen Hobe, et al, “A New Chapter for Europe in
Space,” Zeitschrift für Luft- und Weltraumrecht I: 54 (2005),
346-347.
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Secondly, specifically on space it was
provided:
1. To promote scientific and technical
progress, industrial competitiveness,
and the implementation of its
policies, the Union shall draw up a
European space policy. To this end, it
may promote joint initiatives, support
research
and
technological
development, and coordinate the
efforts needed for the exploration and
exploitation of space.
2. To contribute to attaining the
objectives referred to in paragraph 1,
European laws or framework laws
shall
establish
the
necessary
measures, which may take the form
of a European space program.
3. The Union shall establish any
appropriate relations with the
European Space Agency. 133

By many, this was considered to represent the
first true acceptance of a competence in space
for the Union, even if only shared or parallel.
This, however, overlooked the fact that
already since 1994, with the adoption of the
Satellite Directive, 134 the Union had exercised
a fundamental competence to regulate satellite
communications as part of the broader
telecommunications sector in the context of
the European Internal Market. From that
moment on, for example, the Commission had
adopted more Regulations, Directives, and
Decisions to deal with specific aspects of
commercial satellite communications 135 and
133

Article III-254, Treaty establishing a Constitution for
Europe.
134
Commission Directive amending Directive 88/301/EEC
and Directive 90/388/EEC, in particular with regard to
satellite communications, 94/46/EC, of 13 October 1994.
135
For example: Commission Directive amending Directive
90/387/EEC with regard to personal and mobile
communications, 96/2/EC, of 16 January 1996; Commission
Directive amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the
implementation of full competition in telecommunications
markets, 96/19/EC, of 13 March 1996; Decision of the
European Parliament and of the Council on a coordinated
authorization approach in the field of satellite personal
communications systems in the Community, No. 710/97/EC,

had handed down Decisions enforcing the
general competition regime in the sector.136 It
also overlooked a similar regulatory
involvement in the satellite navigation area,
beginning with the Regulation setting up the
Galileo Joint Undertaking in 2002. 137
More precisely, therefore, entry into force of
the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for
Europe would have meant a first
comprehensive competence in terms of scope,
not
being
indirectly
deduced
from
competencies in telecommunication and
transport fields (e.g., note that Galileo was
presented first and foremost as a tool for transEuropean transport networks, and still
essentially resides with the Commission’s
Directorate on Transport and Energy). This

of 24 March 1997; Directive of the European Parliament and
of the Council on a common framework for general
authorizations and individual licenses in the field of
telecommunications services, 97/13/EC, of 10 April 1997;
Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the selection and authorization of systems providing mobile
satellite services (MSS); No. 626/2008/EC, of 30 June 2008.
136
For example: Commission Decision relating to a
proceeding pursuant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty and
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (IV/34.768 – International
Private Satellite Partners), No. 94/895/EC, of 15 December
1994; Commission Decision declaring a concentration to be
incompatible with the common market and the functioning of
the EEA Agreement (IV/M.490 – Nordic Satellite
Distribution), No. 96/177/EC, of 19 July 1995; Commission
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was not generally considered to be subject to
dispute, and even as the Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe was running into
trouble, this clause was expected to survive. 138
As it turned out, by way of an unpleasant
surprise for the supporters of European space
cooperation, the Treaty of Lisbon did take one
fundamental step backwards here. The Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union as
per the Treaty of Lisbon in relevant part firstly
faithfully copies Article I-14 of the Treaty
Establishing a Constitution for Europe that
was stated above. 139
Secondly, however, the Treaty now provides:
1. To promote scientific and technical
progress, industrial competitiveness,
and the implementation of its
policies, the Union shall draw up a
European space policy. To this end, it
may promote joint initiatives, support
research
and
technological
development, and coordinate the
efforts needed for the exploration and
exploitation of space.
2. To contribute to attaining the
objectives referred to in paragraph 1,
the European Parliament and the
Council, acting in accordance with
the ordinary legislative procedure,
shall
establish
the
necessary
measures, which may take the form
of a European space program,
excluding any harmonization of the
laws and regulations of the Member
States.
3. The Union shall establish any
appropriate relations with the
European Space Agency.
4. This Article shall be without
prejudice to the other provisions of
this Title. 140
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Note that paragraphs 1 and 3 are identical to
paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article III-254 of the
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe,
and that paragraph 4, though not present in the
latter, does only confirm the default
relationship. Thus, paragraph 2 is the key
difference here.
First, it replaces the reference to European
laws and framework laws (the new names
proposed by the Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe for Regulations and
Directives) with a more complicated formula,
which in essence still refers to EC secondary
law. 141 Second, a clause is now added
excluding from any such EU competence the
possibility to use Regulations, Directives, or
Decisions for the purpose of harmonizing laws
and regulations of EU member states.
Consequently, the EU competence on space is
now limited to adopting secondary EU law
that either (1) establishes a space project or
space program and presumably takes care of
its financing through EU budgets, or (2)
applies the freedoms of movement of goods,
services, persons and capital as well as the
competition regime to the space sector, as the
remaining key pillars of the Internal Market
not covered by the last clause of paragraph 2.
With regard to the latter, moreover, with the
exception
of
areas
of
satellite
telecommunications and satellite navigation
where the leadership role of the Commission
and also in the legislative domain is generally
accepted and already has led to secondary EU
law being adopted, actual adoption of
Regulations, Directives, or Decisions may run
into problems. Any existence of member state
regulation on any such topic – as part of the
exercise of member state competence, left
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unhampered under Article 4(3) of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union –
might be expected either to exclude ipso facto
a right for the EU institutions to adopt
secondary EU law, or lead to sufficient
opposition in the Council to preclude such
adoption in practice.
Still, the combined force of existing
competencies in the satellite communication
and satellite navigation fields, the clauses of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, and the subsidiarity principle vis-à-vis
the inherently global domain of outer space
may well lead to increasing activity of the EU
institutions in the space domain. Once the
Council would be convinced that it is in the
overarching interest to do so, the framework
briefly outlined above certainly would allow
this to happen.
Conclusions
From the above analyses of the often
painstaking and complicated processes of
European integration, it may be concluded that
the involvement of key intergovernmental
entities in Europe, including the European
Union and ESA, in space security is rapidly
evolving at least on a political and visibility
level, even as such involvement is crucially
shaped by the institutional structures and the
roles of the member states in delineating
relevant competencies. The outside reality that
space activities are almost always inherently
security-sensitive or even simply developed
from security needs has caught up with the
principled prohibition in the relevant
documents (for the European Union at least
until the Treaty on European Union) to
become fundamentally involved in security
issues. The European flagship projects,
Galileo and GMES, may be seen as clear
indicators that indeed a gradual acceptance of
the inevitability of involvement of the Union

and the Agency into the field of space security
has started to occur.
This process so far has been largely an
indirect one, bringing many factors together –
the
increasing
entanglement,
even
convergence, of ESA and the EU, the gradual
swallowing of the WEU by the latter (where
perhaps that process is most advanced with
respect to the space part of the WEU), the
double perspective of security and space from
which the Union is addressing space security,
the joint development of the flagship projects,
the specific focus on international trade in and
exports of security-sensitive technology, and
trying to cope with potential Internal Marketdistorting consequences of national licensing
regimes on export control. The process is
further driven by the political will of the
Union to be in Europe’s driver’s seat with
regard to global developments, such as
concerning the Wassenaar Arrangement and
the MTCR, but also Space Situational
Awareness and other space security-related
issues.
The failed Treaty Establishing a Constitution
for Europe and the successful Treaty of
Lisbon from that perspective together
represented the extent to which the EU and its
leading institutions, first of all the
Commission, were able to move along that
path so far, and establish a first measure of
legislative and regulatory coherence on the
European front. The results, as analyzed, are
rather mixed and certainly do not overcome
many of the complications, sometimes
perhaps even inconsistencies, arising as a
result from the manifold angles from which
issues of space security are addressed in
Europe.
For example, in spite of the increasing
cooperation of the Union and ESA in matters
of space policy, and now even projects, a fullfledged integration of ESA into the Union
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does not seem to be plausible for now. Issues,
such as the conflicting approach to the
financing of space industry in the context of
European space projects, with ESA largely
still forced to adhere to the “fair return”
concept and the Union insisting on open and
competitive procurement, will therefore
continue to require ad-hoc solutions, as was
achieved for example for Galileo. In that
sense, institutionally speaking, Europe has not
yet moved fundamentally beyond the
Framework Agreement. This is not to
diminish the value and importance of what has
been achieved.
To paraphrase the most famous quote in space
history, it may not be the giant leap hoped for,
but it is a small step forward opening up the
prospect of more steps in the same direction.
Security is also high on the agenda in Europe,
space is increasingly playing an indispensable
role in that context, and the flagship projects
may well turn out to prove that the best way to
deal with these issues would be by allowing
more space for integrated decision-making at
a European level, in which case both the
European Union and ESA will be
indispensable players – or at the very least
indispensable vehicles for the sovereign
member states to ensure their individual
interests would not unduly obstruct the
overarching European interests in security,
space, and in space security.

99

